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The idea to create The Mediterranean Pact 
After the Second World War the creation of the Mediterranean Pact was strongly 
connected to the formation of other defence systems, so we can establish that the 
Mediterranean Pact would have been a security/defence organisation. We have to take 
into consideration most Mediterranean countries, which are situated out of Europe, were 
colonially dependent on the Western European countries, and at that time were just 
starting to fight for their independence. They were sensible towards new political ideas, 
and some of them were geographically too close to the Soviet Union. The Western 
countries could not control them as colonies, but they were very important for them. Not 
only for their strategic position, but these countries are very rich of raw materials also. 
However, after the Second World War their security was not resolved, because European 
countries were in a very bad economic situation, due to the damage caused by the war. 
The only country that was able to assure an efficient defence system was the United States 
of America. Although at that time the American law did not permit to its states to 
participate in defence systems out of the continent in peacetime. It was realised only when 
American Senate accepted the motion of Senator Vandenberg on 11 June, 1948. Before 
the acceptation of the Vandenberg motion, the United States urged its European allies to 
find a solution for their security problems without the direct help of the United States. 
We do not have the exact date when the Mediterranean Pact was mentioned in 
political discussions for first time; however, Tsaldaris - the Greek Foreign Minister -
during his visit in the U.S. in the August of 1947 mentioned to the Secretary of State, 
Marshall, the idea to create a Mediterranean Pact Marshall welcomed the idea. The USA 
after the Second World War recognised the importance of the Mediterranean region. 
President Truman extended the containment policy to the Mediterranean region too in 
March of 1947, but he was convinced that the centre of the defence should be Europe. 
After the Second World War the United State wanted England to have the controlling 
position in the area, but at the middle of the 50s it can be noticed that the USA took this 
position. "The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the 
security of the United States... The security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union succeeded in its efforts to obtain 
control of any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey or Iran. In view of the 
foregoing, it should be the policy of the United States, in accordance with the principles 
and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, to support the security of the Eastern 
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Mediterranean and the Middle East As a corollary of this policy the United States should 
assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran. In carrying out this policy the United States should be prepared to make 
full use of its political, economic, and if necessary, military power in such manner as may 
be found most effective... It would be naturalistic for the United States to undertake to 
carry out such a policy unless the British maintain their strong strategic political and 
economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and unless they and 
ourselves follow parallel policies in that area..."1 
The country that has control over Italy, Greece and Turkey, has the power to control 
the Mediterranean. Although, the other very important reason why the USA started to 
consider the Mediterranean as a valuable region is, the existence of oil. Because of their 
geographical position at the gulf of the Mediterranean Sea, by ruling these countries the 
area can be kept very easily under control; perhaps they were the only countries where we 
can see a democratic political system similar to the western democracies. In the opinion of 
Tsaldaris, the axis of the Mediterranean Pact would be Italy, Greece and Turkey, and 
could join them Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. In the view of Bevin, some other countries 
from the Middle East and maybe in the future Spain could also join the Pact After his 
visit in London, where he met Bevin, Tsaldaris in an interview of 22 February 1949 
summarises their ideas and discussions on the Mediterranean Pact as follows: „I have 
proposed to the British Foreign Minister, Bevin, to create a Mediterranean Pact once the 
NATO would have been created. The realisation shall be made in two steps: in the first 
step the Mediterranean countries shall be united, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, Great 
Britain and "after we hope Spain In the second step a Middle East Pact shall be formed 
with Greece, Turkey, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt Saudi-Arabia, Jordan and 
maybe Pakistan.2 
The relation of the Mediterranean Pact with other defence systems 
Regarding the problem of the security of the Mediterranean countries in conformity 
with the European ones, we can see two important periods in the forming of their defence 
systems. The first one before, and the second one was after the creation of the NATO. But 
there is an important difference between the two areas. The European defence system was 
really created; however, the Mediterranean defence system remained only in state of 
discussions. Real political discussions on it have never been started; the Mediterranean 
Pact was only an idea mentioned several times by politicians. In an article „Mediterranean 
Pact" of the Zafer of 28 October 1949, Mucahit Topalak summarises the reasons of the 
failure of creating the Mediterranean Pact at the time of the idea's emergence: 
1 FRUS 1948. Ш., 378-NSC Files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 1 Series, Report by the National Security 
Council, Washington, February 10, 1948. 
2 In.: Oriente Moderno, Anno XXIV. No. 1-3. 
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1. The rejection of participation of Spain in the UN. 
2. The missing solution for the problems of the colonies in North Africa. 
3. Conflicts between Arabs and Hebrews because of the Palestine problems. 
4. Conflicts of the Big Syria. 
5. The Civil War in Greece. 
6. The confused situation in Yugoslavia. 
The author of the article concludes that - at the time of writing the article - lots of 
problems, mentioned above had already been resolved, and new discussions can be started 
on the creation of the Pact.3 
At the time of formulating the Brussels-Pact we can see emerging different ideas to 
resolve the security problems of the Mediterranean area. When the NATO was created 
and these countries were left out of the organisation, a new wave of talking on the 
Mediterranean security problems can be noticed. It is not surprising, because after the 
creation of the NATO (4 April, 1949) people lived one of the most dangerous periods of 
the Cold War, when the threat of a real war was incredibly strong (Korean War, the 
success of the Soviet Union to create an atomic bomb etc). After 1953 it cannot be seen 
any progress in the defence systems except for the NATO. Greece and Turkey was also 
able to join the NATO, because the threaten of a real war has diminished. At the time of 
the creation of the NATO, the Western Allies could not permit these countries to join the 
organisation because there was a fear that The Soviet Union would see this act as a 
temptation to surround its territory with a military alliance, and would answer the action 
with an aggressive step. After the end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin it was not 
urgent any more to create a new defence system, so the idea of the Mediterranean Defence 
Pact was forgottea 
The European defence system based on the Brussels Pact - with the acceptance of 
Italy and West Germany in 1954 - became Western European Union, but it still remained 
' in a strong dependence on the NATO. After 1954, only the creation of a Middle East 
organisation was mentioned and, it was mainly supported by Great Britain. As Great 
Britain was losing its control in that area, The Crown hoped to reinforce its position by 
creating a series of treaties between those countries. Great Britain would have welcomed 
Italy as a partner in the Treaty of Baghdad, which was a Pact of Mutual Cooperation 
Between Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of 
Pakistan and the Kingdom of Iran realised in February 1955. Italy was not convinced of 
the use of the Middle East Pact, and finally the growing conflict between Israel and 
Arabic countries, and the Suez Crisis in 1956 rendered impossible any solution. The crisis 
of Suez also resulted different views in the politics towards the Arabic countries among 
France, Great Britain, Italy, and the USA. 
In the framework of the Mediterranean Pact we also have to mention the Balkan Pact, 
which was realised in February 1953 among Greece Turkey and Yugoslavia. It could be 
considered the first step towards an Eastern-Mediterranean Pact. When it became more 
and more clear to the Soviet Union in 1948 that Tito was following an autonomous policy, 
3 ASMAE Medio Oriente 1949. Busta4., Prunas, Embassy of Italy in Ankara to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
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and Yugoslavia was excluded from the Cominform, it became possible for the West to try 
to get the country into the western sphere. Yugoslavia's geographical position made the 
country important for the U.S. The Soviet Union with the control over Yugoslavia could 
get the possibility to have the access to the Adriatic Sea. Besides, Great Britain wanted to 
create some Balkan Community controlled by the British Empire to maintain its guiding 
role in the area and to avoid the reinforcement of the Italian influence. Italy of course 
preferred seeing Turkey and Greece in the NATO because in this case Great Britain would 
not have had as much power; Italy could have had more importance as a bridge between 
the Mediterranean and the West. However, Italy due to the question of Trieste would have 
never joined any agreements made with Yugoslavia until this question was resolved. 
The discussions on the Balkan Pact started at the beginning of 1952, almost at the 
same time when Greece and Turkey entered the NATO. The Treaty of Friendship and 
Collaboration was signed in February 1953, but a real military collaboration had not been 
realised yet at that moment. 
Italy and the Mediterranean Pact 
There is no doubt that the role of Italy in the creation of different international 
organisations was very special. It is extremely true for the defence systems because the 
geographical position has a great influence on the formation of any defence systems. 
Taking this factor into account, Italy could participate in any organisations including both, 
Western and Mediterranean countries. "Mr. Hickerson stated he believed that Italy was an 
integral part of Western European security, although she also would be eligible for any 
Mediterranean arrangement that might be devised."4 In addition, in the Mediterranean 
Italy can vindicate a guiding role based on the traditionally strong relation with the other 
countries, which has its origin in the time of the Roman Empire. Another factor that 
helped a better collaboration was that, Italy was not a colonising nation any longer, and 
because Italy's colonial policies failed, it started to support the independence of the 
colonised countries in the Mediterranean. Talking about a possible joining of Italy to the 
Soviet sphere, despite the presence of very strong Communist and Socialist Parties the 
getting into the power of these parties was not probable so Italy would not join to any 
organisation of Eastern Europe. 
But until the first democratic election was held on the 18 of April 1948, the 
politicians, who wanted to restate Italy's position in Europe as a medium power and 
wanted the country join to the democratic powers, were not prepared to accept the 
entrance of Italy into any military organisation. They were afraid that the opposition 
would use out the fact that immediately after a failed war they want to join again to a 
military alliance. The reason was not only this. They were also convinced, that kind of 
organisations can be really efficient that could see the United States as a member stale. 
When the first discussions were started about the defence systems, at the end of 1947 and 
4 FRUS 1948, Ш., 840.20 17-2648. Memorandum of the Sixth Meeting of the Working Group 
Participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 26, 1948 
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at the beginning of 1948, it was not sure that America would take part in iL The 
discussions on the Brussels Pact and on the Mediterranean Pact have a lot in common. 
The proposal of Bevin, the English Foreign Minister about creating a security alliance 
among the European countries, was based on that United States suggestion that the 
European countries should be able to resolve their defence alone, without the participation 
of the USA. Originally Bevin talked about the formation of three different defence areas: 
one in the Atlantic, one in Europe and one in the Mediterranean. "The most practical 
course, in Mr. Bevin's view, is to work for the following three systems: - (i) The United 
Kingdom-France-Benelux system with United States backing; (ii) A scheme of Atlantic 
Security, with which the United States would be even more closely concerned; (iii) A 
Mediterranean security system, which would particularly affect Italy."5 In Europe he 
invited the following countries to join the Pact: France, the Benelux countries and Italy. 
Italy refused the participation due to the reasons mentioned above. Therefore on the 17 
March, 1948 the Brussels Pact was signed without Italy. Although this Pact talks about 
economic, social and cultural co-operation, the most important part of it is the military co-
operation. The birth of the Brussels Pact was very well seen in the USA and some days 
later The United States and Canada also started Exploratory Talks on creating an Atlantic 
defence system. Italy's behaviour in front of the Brussels Pact, was interpreted that the 
sign of unreliability and talking about the future members of the Atlantic Pact its name 
was neither mentioned. 
Partly because Italy refused the Brussels Pact the country was not invited to 
participate in the Exploratory Talks about the creation of the NATO. There were present 
only the countries of the Brussels Pact, the United States and Canada. The United States 
thought that if they invited Italy to be a member they have should face all the problems of 
the Mediterranean and Italy was too weak militarily to help the functioning of the alliance 
efficiently. "The inclusion of Italy, for instance, would raise the question of the whole 
Mediterranean. He suggested that, for the time being, the Brussels Powers should limit 
themselves to dealing with the security problem of Western Europe by trying to reinforce 
the Brussels Pact through an association with the United States and Canada."6 
Consequently the USA continued to support the creation of a Mediterranean Pact in which 
Italy could have had a guiding role as a compensation for the non-invitation and also the 
presence of England in the Pact could assure the relation with the NATO. But Italy was 
not convinced about the utility of a Mediterranean Pact. Examining the reasons for the 
Italian refusal to accept the invitation of participating in the Brussels Pact we can partly 
answer the question why Italy did not want to participate in a possible Mediterranean 
Pact. The reasons for the refusal in both of the cases are very similar: 
• Italy was firmly convinced that any kinds of military organisations could not be 
efficient enough without the membership of the United States. 
5 FRUS 1948. Ш., 840.20/3-1148; The British Embassy to the department of State, Aide Mémoire 
6 FRUS 1948. Ш., 840.20/7-748. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory 
Talks on Security, July 8,1948, 10 am. 
170 Katalin PINTÁCSI 
• Italy traditionally had some aversion in confront of England because of their 
competition in the Mediterranean. On one hand the ex-colonies of Italy were under 
British Military Administration control after the Second World War and for example 
in the case of the tragedy of Mogadiscio in Somaliland the British did not do anything 
to prevent or punish the delinquents. On the other hand it was clear for Italy that in an 
alliance where the English are the most powerful they cannot do anything against the 
British dominance. They wanted to see the USA as the leader of the allied parties. 
England supported the project firmly, because it seemed to be the only way for them to 
make over the dominance in the Mediterranean area. It is known that at that times the 
English Colonial Empire started to collapse and the British hoped that they could 
counteract the dominance of the United States in that way. Here I would like to 
mention the reaction of France to the Mediterranean Pact It seem to be obvious that 
France also wanted to preserve its important role in the area, so the French preferred to 
create a Mediterranean Alliance under theirs own leadership. 
• Italy, after the war preferred to support the economic co-operation instead of the 
military one because the country did not have enough resources to spend on military 
expenses, and with the economic integration could have hoped some growth in the 
economy. Italy, in relation of the Mediterranean countries hoped to move on towards 
the economic co-operation. For Italy it was extremely important to create and maintain 
good relationship with the Mediterranean countries, because the country is really 
power in sources of raw material especially needed the natural gas and the oil of these 
countries. Italy could form any kind of relations with these countries easily, because it 
could play the role of the supporter of their independence. As it said in an interview of 
Minister Guidotti to the newspaper Akhbar El-Yom: "... Instead of a Mediterranean 
Pact we have to talk about a Mediterranean Community. ... And how we can realise 
this politics of collaboration? ... The instruments can be the followings: commercial 
and economic changes, support of Italian experts, technicians and qualified working 
forces to those countries, intellectual and cultural contacts, tourism, and so oa" 7 At 
that time the European Union neither existed, but if we make a comparison between 
the European Union's Mediterranean Policy and the words of the Italian politician, the 
concept is similar. 
• There is an other important reason why Italy refiised the participation in the Pact. 
Unfortunately both that time and even nowadays, conflicts existing in the area could 
only be resolved very hard. Consider First Arab Israeli War or, the conflict between 
England and Egypt for example. 
The fact that Sforza - the Foreign Minister of Italy at that period - did not mention in 
his Memoirs the Mediterranean Pact shows the disinterests of the country. 
7 ASMAE Medio Oriente 1949. Busta 1. 1949. October 20. 
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So Italy preferred to support the economic co-operation not only with the 
Mediterranean countries. They wanted to reach this goal by bilateral agreements on the 
economic, the cultural and the social fields. In Europe, the country became one of the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the integration especially on the field of economy and 
politics. For example they proposed to France to create a customs union, but unfortunately 
was not possible to realise that kind of collaboration with the Mediterranean countries due 
to their bad economic situation. 
In the framework of the co-operation with the Mediterranean countries important 
treaties that was ratified by Italy was the Treaty with Greece in November 1948 and with 
Turkey in March 1950, the two countries, that would formed together with Italy the axis 
of the Mediterranean Pact. Italy also signed a Treaty with Egypt in April of 1948. Than 
Italy signed a Treaty with Lebanon in February 1949. 
During the first term of the discussions on the NATO, the Italian government did not 
have any confirmed policy towards it. The most important ambassadors - Alberto 
Tarchiani (Washington), Tommaso Gallarati Scotti (London), Pietro Quaroni (Paris) -
were convinced that Italy should take a part in the NATO from the beginning. They 
persuaded the Foreign Minister, Carlo Sforza, and the Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, 
and when the Senate rejected the Motion of Nenni, leader of the Socialist Party, on 
neutralism on 4 of December 1948 there was not any other obstacles to join a military 
system. The Memorandum of Sforza arrived in Washington on 6 of January 1949 in 
which Italy asked information on the NATO. On 12 of January, Tarchiani presented the 
application of Italy for the membership in the organisation. After that, thanks to the 
successful Italian lobby and the mediation of France Italy got the invitatioa France 
wanted to see Italy among the members of the NATO because hoped to find an ally to 
help the Mediterranean interests. France threatened the NATO to remain out of the 
organisation also. Finally Italy signed the Treaty as a foundation member on 4 of April 
1949. There was an other important fact that could help the joining of Italy. When 
discussions were started on Brussels Pact, Italy hoped to find a good camp to help the 
revision of the Peace Treaty, mainly in three fields. The three fields are the military 
clauses, colonies and the question of Triest. As soon as Italian Politicians recognised that 
this policy could only worsen their position, they declared that they would not use the 
Brussels Pact or the NATO for the revision, the opinion of the USA and Great Britain 
became more positive. The question of Trieste was really delicate. In the Tripartite 
Declaration of March 1948, just before the first democratic election in Italy the United 
States, Great Britain and France promised, that Italy would get the control on the A zone. 
At the same time Jugoslavia was exluded from the Cominform and the Western Allies 
could see the possibility to have the control on Jugoslavia, a strategically important 
country. That is why they did not want to rescue to realise the decision favourable for 
Italy. But when in 1954 become more and more clear that Tito did not want to introduce a 
democratic system in Jugoslavia, the question of the A Zone could be resolved. In 1949 
when Italy too had difficulties to enter into the organisation we could not imagine that 
once Greece and Turkey would became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. "While 
our thinking on Greece and Turkey has not fully crystallised we believe Italy fits naturally 
into Western European defence system, but are inclined to question practicability of 
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separate Mediterranean system. We likewise fail to see how separate Mediterranean 
system would in any way make Italian military clause problem any easier."8 That is why 
the idea of the Mediterranean Pact was mentioned several times before the participation of 
Greece and Turkey. Italy could get an important role in it again, but its interest was to 
support these two countries to enter the NATO. In a Mediterranean Pact it would be 
England that played the part of the main power and the NATO where several 
Mediterranean countries were members and among them Italy could have the leadership. 
Finally, Greece and Turkey got the Membership with the strong support of Italy in 1952. 
After that any Mediterranean Pact lost its probability because the countries in the Middle 
East were not able to find the solution for co-operatioa 
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